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 Aleksejs Šņitņikovs 
[Bureaucratization in the Civilizing Process] 
 
 
In his book Involvement and Detachment Norbert Elias is describing a hypothetical situation, in which self-
constraint and self-regulation of individuals would be developed so highly that there would be no need, for 
their peaceful collective life in society, of agencies of external constraint backed up by the means of violence. 
People in that imagined community would have a thorough understanding that enjoyable life in society is 
possible only when people willingly submit themselves to the common rules. If people as a result of conflict 
or a lapse in their ability to control themselves would break any rule, they would without compelling force 
on the part of the society‟s agent pay whatever compensation there would be considered appropriate for the 
breach of the rules. They would behave according to understanding that if anyone would not abide by the 
rules willingly or be ready to compensate for the breach of any rule, no-one could be expected to do that 
either (Elias 1983: 76).  
Elias notices that obviously the present level of development is far from the described picture. People 
would need a much greater capacity for self-control to dispense with the agencies of external restraint. At 
the present stage, however, peaceful co-existence of individuals for the long time is not possible without the 





The problem of civilizing of the monopolists of the means of violence 
Elias makes a point that the position of the control may be misused by the controllers, as they may wish 
to use their position to increase their own power ratio (ibidem). With regard to this Elias writes: «The civi-
lizing of these monopolists of physical violence within a state is an unsolved problem» (Elias 1983: 77). This 
is an abstract statement which can fully be applied to the modern public officials whose‟ activity may not be 
primarily related to the use of physical violence of the state, but rather the state‟s authority which is ulti-
mately backed by the means of physical violence.  
 
The problem of the civilizing of the monopolists of physical violence, in particular, the feudal lords and 
the kings, was dealt with, of course, in his books The Court Society and The Civilizing Process.  
  Particularly in The Court Society Elias shows the processes of the civilizing of the upper strata of France. 
He demonstrates that the pacification of the nobility and transformation of the patterns of its conduct was an 
outcome of the largely unintended, unplanned civilizing process. It was preceded by the elimination struggle 
among the French princes which resulted in centralization of the kingdom – the process described in the 
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second volume of The Civilizing Process. This was referred to by Elias as a first phase in the dynamics of the 
monopoly mechanism (Elias 1939: 276). The military significance of the nobility in the Early Modern Eu-
rope was diminishing, but their dependence on the king‟s favour was increasing. Nobility was gradually 
drawn to the court to serve personally the king in various capacities fulfilling the functions of often useless 
offices. As the basis of their power and independence was shattered, so the pattern of their conduct changed. 
Their function was mostly to counterweight the growing power of the cities and the bourgeoisie. Trapped in 
this figuration, king and aristocracy developed new forms of social interaction characterized by more per-
manent and stricter self-restraint, higher sensitivity, refinement of manners, aestheticism and foresight. On 
the one hand this apparently was a civilizing of the upper class – the controllers of the monopolized means of 
violence. On the other hand, the king theoretically remained the sole owner of the kingdom and could act as 
if it were his property. He was not constrained, especially after the Estates assembly ceased to be convoked, 
in his capacity as a lawmaker and the executive. As Elias writes, he was still not opposed by a consolidated 
society and in this situation he could completely identify himself with his office, his private life and his king-
dom and could rule in the country as in his household (Elias 1969: 149). There is a peculiar characteristic of 
patrimonialism, pointed at by Reinhard Bendix. In order to keep the balance of power the central ruler has 
to be to some degree arbitrary and unpredictable. He should be able to raise certain families or groups and 
cast others into disgrace on the “subjective” grounds. When the power ratio of the central ruler is temperate, 
he is constrained by tradition. But when his power ratio is high, as in the era of absolutism, he can disregard 
tradition (Bendix 1964, 1978). This situation ultimately leads to the second phase of the monopoly mecha-
nism. That is, the monopoly of violence passes from the hands of one person or a limited number of individ-
uals to a greater number of people and finally becomes «a function of the interdependent human web as a 
whole» (Elias 1939: 276).  
The monopoly mechanism describes important aspects of the civilizing of the power elites. Another, 
more specific, yet significant mechanism, to which Elias paid much less attention, was bureaucratization of 
polities in Western societies from the 16th century on. Bureaucratization of the states was also to a great ex-
tent an unintended process. There could be mentioned some examples. According to Michael Mann, sub-
stantial bureaucratization first took place in the military forces. With the introduction of the field armies, 
the significance of the state supply of the means of warfare increased. In addition, the complexity of the 
methods of waging wars increased and bureaucratization served as a method of coordination of various parts 
of the army: infantry, cavalry and artillery (Mann 1998: 445). These methods of coordination proved to be 
effective and were taken upon by the civil government.  
There were other, earlier precursors to bureaucratization. The concept of office introduced in the 
Catholic Church was an object of imitation by the civil governments (Wolter 1988). Revival and develop-
ment of the Roman law was another instrument of bureaucratization. Gradually it was introduced in the 
work of the state organs. At stage of the development of the state, characterized by the dual rule of the 
prince and the assembly of the Estates (Ständestaat), procedures of debates among the princes and the Estates 
were ordered and regulated by legal rules which left the civilizing effect on the power elites (Poggi 1978). 
Absolutist France was not among the countries which substantially bureaucratized their administrations 
in Early Modern period. According to Thomas Ertman, France‟s state‟s infrastructural power can be better 
described as patrimonial. Ertman‟s analysis offers explanation why in some polities infrastructural power in 
Early Modern Europe developed in a form which can be described as patrimionial, while in other European 
polities infrastructural power developed along bureaucratic lines. The case of France the emergence of this 
particular type of the infrastructural power is explained by the early onset of the sustained military competi-
tion with other polities, in particular, England. This resulted in the strength of local lords and magnates who 
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were able, in bargaining with the central ruler over the terms of the military service, to appropriate the 
means of administration and for a longer time retain significant power. Effective bureaucratization in Early 
Modern times took place in another part of Europe: Prussia, Denmark and Sweden were the first countries 
which introduced bureaucracy as the key feature of the buildup of the infrastructural power. Timing, that is, 
historically later rise of a consolidated state, effective subordination of the local lords and representative as-
semblies, greater monetization of economy and supply of educated personnel at that time (late 16th and 17th 
centuries) are the key explanations behind the more successful bureaucratization in these polities. Swedish 
political scientist H. Gustaffson considers that Denmark and Sweden in the 18th century possessed the most 
bureaucratized and professional public administrations in Europe.  
Elias‟ reflections in the Involvement and Detachment offer an insightful language in which one can character-
ize the civilizing effects of bureaucratization on societies in general and the controllers of the monopolized 
means of violence in particular. He introduces the terms „involvement‟ and „detachment‟ to denote the dif-
ferent ways people regulate themselves: individuals in the control of their thoughts, feelings and drives can 
be more involved or more detached (Elias 1983: xxxii).  
Greater involvement in the current situation means a greater emotionality and weaker self-control, a 
weaker ability to think clearly and act adequately. Greater detachment presupposes an ability to see the situ-
ation in impersonal terms; the consciousness is less coloured by wishes and fears and less affected by the 
immediate concerns here and now (Elias 1983: xxxvi). As a result, the individual is able to steer himself in a 
way which is more adequate for the particular circumstances and with a greater benefit for himself.  
The ability to control the individual self is linked to the ability to control the natural or social environ-
ment. Seen in the evolutionary terms, humans progress in the direction of greater detachment, higher ability 
to control the physical and social environments and their own selves. Elias describes the earlier stages of 
human development, when humans had not learnt to master the processes of nature. The nature was seen 
with a greater involvement: natural processes were seen in terms of persons, or “spirits”. The characteristic 
question in that situation is: «What does that mean for me or for us?» and the answers usually involve a great 
deal of fantasy which constructs the reality in terms of animated beings and purposeful actors. It has taken a 
long time for the humans to learn to detach themselves from the processes of nature to such degree as to 
start to think of nature in terms of the regulations and mechanisms peculiar to it without an immediate ref-
erence to their selves. The important precondition for such progress was the greater security which was 
won in the hard battle with the natural forces. The imposition of the discipline of a greater detachment 
meant loss in satisfaction which the self derives from seeing the world in the personal terms. The world 
filled by purposeless forces which follow impersonal laws does not seem so appealing and gratifying. But the 
humans‟ gain is much greater, for the ability to think more clearly about nature allowed to control effective-
ly the natural forces with the great benefit and radical improvements of the conditions of life. The greater 
detachment from the natural environment was made possible by «distancing from the situation of the mo-
ment» and introduction of the intermediary activity, which presupposed «remembering a past and anticipat-
ing possible future situation» (Elias 1983: xxxvi).      
Elias considers that human ability to control the processes of nature has developed much further than the 
ability to control social processes. Social groups represent danger to each other which causes insecurity and 
determines greater affectivity and involvement; this makes it more difficult to rise to a higher level of de-
tachment. Elias formulated a «principle of increasing facilitation»: «the lower the social standards of control 
in manipulating and of detachment and adequacy in thinking about them, the more difficult is it to raise the-
se standards» (Elias 1983: 34).   
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According to Elias, a more detached consciousness operates with evaluations of processes – physical or 
social – which are value-free and are autonomous from the exigencies of the situation. For example, natural 
sciences operate almost exclusively with intra-scientific valuations, and have achieved a high level of auton-
omy and detachment. Achievement of a greater degree of detachment, Elias stresses, presupposes existence 
of certain social conditions. Considering the case of scientists he notes that they are «protected by firmly 
established professional standards and other institutional safeguards against the intrusion of heteronomous 
evaluations» (Elias 1983: 6). Elias formulates the following principle: «The greater the involvement the 
greater the tendency towards heteronomous valuations: the greater the detachment the greater the tendency 




Bureaucracy as the means of civilizing of politics  
Description of the ethos of bureaucratic office found in Max Weber‟s works can be seen in terms of a de-
tached consciousness and behaviour. Some of his characterizations of bureaucratic comportment refer pre-
cisely to what can be called a detached demeanour. So, Weber writes that the bureaucrat in the discharge of 
his duties should act «without regard for persons», but should take into account only objective considera-
tions (Weber 1978: 975). Bureaucrats‟ official conduct should be governed by the principle sine ira et studio 
– without hate or love. The bureaucrat, unlike the feudal lord, should not be lead by «sympathy and favor, 
by grace and gratitude» (ibidem). Weber is quite unequivocal on this subject: 
 
Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is “dehumanized”, the more completely it succeeds in elimi-
nating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape 
calculation (ibidem).  
 
A developed bureaucracy in a highly differentiated and complex civilization demands a «personally de-
tached and strictly objective expert» (ibidem). A bureaucrat‟s impartiality demands, in Weber‟s words, «a 
supremely ethical discipline and self-denial» (Weber 1922: 331). This description does not mean that an 
official does not have any freedom of action. On the contrary, as John Rohr shows, the discretion of the 
public official is an integral part of the work in the public administration and in the last decades it has even 
widened following the expansion of the fields of responsibility of the agencies in the public sector (Rohr 
1998). The creative element in the activity of an official is present, but that action is not arbitrary, is not 
lead by «personally motivated favor and valuation» (Weber 1978: 979).  
Discussing impartiality and neutrality of the bureaucrat Weber refers to several situations: impartiality to 
„persons‟ when an executive public official is considering the cases of the citizens; impartiality, professional-
ism and objectivity in relations with the colleagues; and neutrality in relation to the political bosses. In the 
context of the democratic state the ethic of the bureaucrat is distinctive from the ethos of the politician. 
Weber put it in the following way: 
 
„To be above parties‟ – in truth, to remain outside the realm of the struggle for power – is the official‟s role, 
while the struggle for personal power, and the resulting personal responsibility, is the lifeblood of the politician as 
well as of the entrepreneur (Weber, 1978: 1404). 
 
If necessary, a bureaucrat should implement an order or policy which is contrary to his personal convic-
tions or political creed. Or, as the case may be, he should control personal enthusiasm towards the policies 
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promulgated by the elected politicians. As Weber has emphasized, such «supremely ethical discipline and 
self-denial» (Weber 1922:331) is necessary to keep the state from disintegration.   
In the political system, state bureaucracy serves, in Paul Du Gay‟s expression, as a gyroscope of the state: 
it provides stability, continuity and institutional memory of the state (Du Gay 2006:18). The role of a bu-
reaucrat in the modern democratic state, in his view, is to be cautious towards various political creeds and 
not overzealous about implementation of particular courses of action. A bureaucrat and public administra-
tion should be separated, divorced from «private moral absolutisms» (Du Gay 2006:5). Without such fea-
ture, the important traits of public administration, like reliability and procedural fairness, could not be en-
sured (ibidem).  
When discussing the “neutrality” of a public official in his relations with the civil society, Du Gay points 
out that an official should be autonomous and superior to extra-official ties to “kith, kin and conscience” and 
separate himself from the extra-official ties, including his personal interest (Du Gay 2006:3).  
In official documents and regulations this stipulation is known nowadays as a rule limiting the conflict of 
interests. Conflict of interests is generally defined as a situation in which a public official has to perform an 
action in which he, his relatives or business partners are personally or financially interested. With some 
modifications the rule prohibiting performance of an official action in such situation can be found in the 
codes of ethics or other types or regulatory documents all around Europe and other parts of the world. The 
purpose of such regulation is to ensure the neutrality in the official work of civil servants. Nowadays it is 
recognized that an official, dealing with matters affecting him or members of his primary group or business 
partners is likely not to act without personal involvement. Personal interest, or involvement, in the issue at 
hand can unduly affect the course of official business and the decision to be taken. The conduct of a bureau-
crat in such situation can take a direction which would be contrary to the purposes of the office. In extreme 
forms the “involved” behaviour in the institutional context of the state grows into “corruption” – the misuse 
of the public office for private gain of the officials or other related persons. In cases of corrupt acts commit-
ted by public officials, striving for satisfaction of short-term wishes completely overrides the orientation to 
the long-term reasons of state. Explanations of the rationale for introduction of the rules regulating the be-
haviour of an official in the situation of conflict of interests and the ways to solve such situations explicitly 
refer to the necessity to ensure autonomy and independence of an official action.     
Du Gay considers bureaucracy an important positive civilizational achievement which is crucial for the 
functioning of the constitutional democracy (Du Gay 2005). Successful fulfillment of the official duties pre-
supposes a „learned behaviour‟ in accordance with the official status and role – «capacity to set aside one‟s 
private, political, moral, regional and other commitments» (Du Gay 2000: 76). In his view, bureaucracy 
serves as a «buffer between civic comportment and personal principles» (ibidem). Indeed, this can be seen 
when bureaucracy is examined in the context of its relations to the politicians and its relation with the civil 
society.  
Bureaucracy serves a restraining function to the sometimes overzealous and passionate politicians: politi-
cal ideas have to pass the filter of autonomous and professional evaluation of corresponding departments; 
bureaucratic experts should weight the consequences of the proposed policy, its costs and benefits, and take 
into account the experience and institutional memory of their agency. Again, as Weber noted, the occupa-
tion of the position in the state bureaucracy presupposes a lengthy training. Nowadays this is exceedingly so. 
Civil servants are supposed to have specialized knowledge in the field of their expertise and the competence 
of their agency. Their professional competence is further advanced by state-financed programmes of training 
and improvement of skills. Civil servants, according to the widespread norm of their codes of conduct, are 
supposed to give “honest and fearless” advice to their political heads. Such advice should be based on learning, 
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scientific knowledge, facts and accurate analysis. Furthermore, as a rule, civil servants are protected by the 
law from unduly influence on their decisions or activity and from the arbitrary removal from the office, to 
encourage honest and autonomous fulfillment of duties. Political neutrality of the civil service has been an 
accepted norm in many democratic polities. In this sense state bureaucracy can be seen as a means of “civiliz-
ing” of politics.  
The similar idea pertains to the relations of the state bureaucracy to the public. Public administration has 
a degree of autonomy from the civil society. It has its own reasons and means to prioritize and deal with the 
issues of the community. The official has the primary duty to be lead by the “reason of state” rather than 
“concerns of the people”: «the term “public” comes to refer to the offices themselves rather than the “com-
mon concerns” or more specifically, the latter come to be seen exclusively in terms of the former» (Du Gay 
2006: 8). Du Gay therefore refers to the pertinence of the critique of recent movements of populist “direct 
democracy” to subject the work of public administration increasingly to the opinion of the groups of citizens 




Bureaucratic detachment and the autonomy of the state 
One can ask: by virtue of what social mechanisms state bureaucracy assumes a detached position in rela-
tion to society? Discussing the definition of democracy, Emile Durkheim makes a point that one should not 
be mistaken by thinking that under the democratic regime the society governs itself. In democracy society 
rather is governed by a group of individuals that is detached from the rest of society, but maintains a regular 
communication with the governed. Society cannot be governed by a public opinion which exists in a diffused 
form in it, at least in case of complex social systems, not the simple communities. In order to be able to 
govern, the state should be connected to but different from the civic life. State does not simply “reflect” the 
individual opinions of the members of society. It should take consideration of many aspects of social life and 
have therefore a different perspective on the society.  In order to govern, it should contemplate the whole of 
the social life. The state provides a different point of view and therefore its deliberations cannot be but dif-
ferent from mere a sum of opinions of individual citizens: 
 
The State comes into existence by a process of concentration that detaches a certain group of individuals from the 
collective mass. In that group the social thought is subjected to elaboration of a special kind and reaches a very high 
degree of clarity. Where there is no such concentration and where the social thought remains entirely diffused, it 
also remains obscure and the distinctive feature of the political society will be lacking. (Durkheim 1957: 82).     
 
Durkheim, however, remained unclear as to the social and historical processes and mechanisms which 
led towards the detachment and autonomization of the state apparatus from the rest of society.  
On this subject, one can consult a more recent literature on state-building. Among sociologists, Reinhard 
Bendix, distinguished in the social systems two aspects: authority and association, arguing, that in the former 
actor‟s orientation to hierarchy and order predominates, while in the latter – orientation on utility and reci-
procity of interests. He argues that such a differentiation is a product of a historical process of development 
of polities, specifically, in Western Europe. During this process the idea of the office as a personal and inher-
itable property gave way to the idea of a bureaucratic office as non-owned and distinct from the personality 
of the incumbent. In course of this state-formation process, the number of functions were, using the words 
of the Swedish historian Kerstin Strömberg-Back, lifted «out of the social order and into a special politico-
administrative sector which possessed sovereign authority» (quoted in L. Jespersen, 2000: 36). Administra-
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tive centralization of polities was the process of particular significance. In course of centralization of polities 
the rulers subdued the local nobilities, magnates and representatives assemblies and ensured more effective 
implementation of the flow of commands issuing from the royal council. Proprietary office-holding would 
be a hindrance to the governing of the state – an obstacle to hierarchical ordering of administration and en-
suring reliable execution of orders. Thus there occurred a transition from patrimonial form of administra-
tion to state bureaucracy. At the same time administration was divorced from family and property relations 
and interests by means of which insulation of the administration from society took place: 
 
By ordering and facilitating the faithful implementation of commands, authority insulates officials from influences 
which would interfere with that implementation. (Bendix 1964: 139)  
  
More recently, Michael Mann provided a more general sociological conceptualization of the state as an 
autonomous social power. As it is helpful for understanding of the process of detachment of bureaucracy 
from the civil society, I will make an outline of his main arguments.   
Michael Mann builds upon the critique of the concepts of the state which consider the state a mere reflec-
tion or fusion of the wills of the social actors in the civil society. For example, in Marxist conceptualizations 
of the state, the state apparatus acts predominantly in the interests of the capitalist class. In the liberal con-
ceptualizations the state is viewed as a result of a social contract concluded by the individuals. He dismisses 
both approaches on the empirical grounds showing in his two volumes The Sources of Social Power that the 
state can act as an autonomous actor.  
The first approximation to the concept of the autonomy of the state can be made by pointing to its dou-
ble set of tasks – one external, oriented towards the other states, and one internal, directed towards civil 
society and the class structure. The state is basically a military organization which function is to defend the 
territory, or a domain of sovereignty. In Elias‟ terms, the modern nation-state is a survival unit (Elias 1987, 
Kaspersen, Gabriel 2008). Charles Tilly has shown that the internal institutional expansion of the states was 
to a considerable extent caused by their military activity – preparation for wars and waging of wars. Military 
and state elites had to extract the resources needed for war but they also had to ensure the reproduction of 
the resources and their availability in the future. They were forced to engage in building of civil institutions, 
including civil bureaucracies, and attending to the educational, health, and social needs of their populations 
(Tilly 1990). Possessing huge material, financial and administrative resources, the state elites could use these 
resources «with a degree of autonomy against either the dominant class, or against domestic war or peace 
factions and foreign states» (Mann 1988: 3).         
Mann set out to advance beyond the militaristic conceptualization of the autonomy of the state. As a 
point of departure he takes the bounding rule-making activity of the state. «Rules are necessary to bind to-
gether strangers or semi-strangers», Mann writes (Mann 1988: 12). Other forms of regulation of relation-
ships like custom, exchange or force, are insufficient in the long run. Enforceable rules are useful for every 
social group. Besides this function Mann points to other functions which states perform: maintenance of in-
ternal order; military defense or aggression; maintenance of infrastructures of communications like roads, 
message systems, monetary system, weights and measures and so on; economic redistribution between dif-
ferent social groups, age groups and so on, to ensure, for instance, the subsistence of the economically inac-
tive (Mann 1988: 13-14). The state fulfills multiplicity of functions which can be best performed from the 
center. Territorial centrality is the third decisive feature of the state. The state employs various means of 
power which by themselves are not specific for the state. Economic, ideological or military means of power 
can be possessed by various groups of society, for example, entrepreneurs, priests or warrior bands or 
groups of armed citizens. But only the state uses these powers in combination as a territorially based and 
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centralized organization possessing the authority to issue and enforce the rules applicable within the demar-
cated territory. In this, Mann argues, lies the nature of the autonomous power of the state. Other social 
groups can control some the sources of social power – economic, ideological, military, but only the state has 
the power of territorially based centralized coordination. And they become dependent on the indispensabil-
ity of the state personnel. Thus for Mann, the primary source of the autonomous power of the state lies in 
its infrastructural power – the ability to «penetrate and centrally coordinate the activities of civil society 
through its own infrastructure» (Mann 1988: 7). By means of the despotic power state elite controls the in-
frastructural power and rules over society. The notion of the despotic power is the conceptual means by 
which one can argue that the state is actually an actor. Mann mentions examples of the divide-and-rule strat-
egies employed by the state elites and documented by historians and historical sociologists. Absolutist mon-
archs can be the instance here. They could manipulate with the needs, interests and fears of different groups 
including aristocracy, urban elites and rural groups and “play off” them against each other and thereby assert 
their independence and autonomy. Studies of absolutism have demonstrated the working of this mechanism 
(Anderson 1987, Elias 1969). Another example is the military function of the state as an aggressor or de-
fender by which it gained autonomy from the dominant economic class.  
Infrastructural and despotic powers vary across the historical time and the world regions. The infrastruc-
tural power of the state may be weak, that is, its ability to perform regulatory, policing and certain universal 
welfare functions and control the means of administration. If this is so, the means of administration will “dis-
appear” into society and will be “leased” to or appropriated by socially powerful groups. Historically this 
situation is observed in feudalism and patrimonial type of administration. Or the state can be infrastructural-
ly strong. This type of infrastructural power of the state is exemplified by state bureaucracy. Mann observes 
that during the past 150 years in the Western world the tendency has been towards the increase of the infra-
structural power while the overall trend of the development of the despotic power remains unclear.        
This notion of usefulness of the centrally and territorially based organization of the state possessing infra-
structural power and providing services for the groups of civil society is helpful for identifying the source of 
the autonomy and detachment of state bureaucracy. State bureaucracy is in principle useful and necessary for 
all groups and therefore it can assume a detached position in relation to any particular group.  
Emphasis on usefulness and functionality, however, has led Mann to the hypothesis that the state power 
emerges by conferring resources and authority to the groups assuming the function of the central coordina-
tion by the members of „civil society‟ as an act of free will. Then these central coordinators begin to exploit 
their position. Once the autonomous power of the state emerges, it becomes very difficult for other social 
groups to get control over it, for the reasons discussed above. Mann puts it in the following way: «The hy-
pothesis is that civil society freely gives resources but then loses control and becomes oppressed by the 
state» (Mann 1988: 20).  
Mann encounters difficulties to find historical evidence for this hypothesis. Some of the instances include 
the foundation of central storehouses found in simpler societies and documented by anthropologists; or crys-
tallization of the military function and subsequent use of the military infrastructure for the centralized coor-
dination of compulsory cooperation, as found, presumably, in ancient agrarian societies. This militaristic 
route towards the acquiring of the infrastructural and despotic power of the state, however, is more defi-
nitely discernable in cases of conquest, not as the result of free placing of the resources and authority in the 
hands of the specialists in warfare. At the same time in the first volume of his The Sources of Social Power Mann 
points to the evidence which he construes as a persistence in the attempt of the people in pre-historical and 
ancient world to resist and prevent the stabilization of the centralized authority and “escape” from being 
“caged” by a power organization, even despite its purported usefulness. He repeatedly points to the exam-
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ples, especially from ancient and medieval history, that subordination of the territory to the unit of central 
coordination often resulted not in permanent centralization of social life but in disintegration of the state-
society. The state turns out to be unable to control the means of administration and these “disappear” into 
the “civil society”. Besides these difficulties, Mann‟s conceptualization of the autonomy of the state power is 
not particularly helpful for understanding the bureaucratization as a part of state-building in the context of 




Differentiation, integration and bureaucratization 
In The Civilizing Process Elias repeatedly underlines the importance of growing “interdependence” of dif-
ferent parts of the country on each other in the course of the civilizing process. The growing division of 
functions with the concomitant process of increasing integration – interdependence among groups and re-
gions, for Elias, lies behind the mechanism of political centralization. On the examples from medieval 
France he shows that economic autarky and political autarky are interrelated. Even in the medieval period 
long-distance trade was not entirely absent, but it was limited mostly to luxury goods. Domains of feudal 
lords were economically in main self-sufficient. Even wine was not generally traded over long distances and 
if one wanted to consume it, one had to produce it in his own land. That is why, Elias, writes, grapes were 
cultivated in the northern regions of France, were wine of good quality could not be produced. At the same 
time the tendency of political decentralization in the 12th century in France had developed so far that the 
king of France could not effectively rule over the territory of the kingdom; his authority in fact was circum-
scribed by the borders of his domain lands. He traveled very little outside of his domain and communication 
with his vassal was very sparse. The feudal lands became independent territories and the vassals acquired 
hereditary rights over them. 
The situation of decentralization and entwinement of political and economic autarky is not limited to the 
medieval period if one looks at other regions of Europe. Under different historical circumstances, a some-
what similar picture could be observed in the 18th century in territory of the present day Latvia. Formerly a 
part or a dependency of Sweden and Poland (from 16th till 18th century), in the course of the 18th century it 
was annexed, by the means of military conquest, by Russia, which at that period was becoming an empire. 
As it is known from the historical and sociological literature, empires are inherently weak administratively 
(Mann 1988; Held et alii 1999). They cannot effectively control the means of administration and these pass 
into the hands of local elites. Patrimonialism thus is the natural type of local administration within the em-
pires. The German landlords, who were the effective masters of this territory and possessed control over the 
local population, succeeded in allodification of the lands they used, that is, in converting the fiefs into their 
property. They enlarged their lands and, given the level of economic development of that time, concentrat-
ed almost entire social system within their estates: industrial production, agriculture, trade and “court” life 
(Dunsdorfs 1973: 315). During the same period, they succeeded in acquiring even more authority over the 
peasants. Latvian provinces were formally the area of jurisdiction of Russian empire but most spheres of life 
in the territory of Latvia in the 18th century were regulated by laws passed in assemblies of the local land-
owners as well as by the rules issued by the particular estates. The landlords exercised disciplining and polic-
ing power, they could be, for certain types of transgressions, simultaneously prosecutors and judges over the 
peasants and were of course masters and employers to them. The governor and his staff, through whom the 
emperor ruled over provinces of Latvia, did not possess sufficient administrative capacity to counteract the 
landowners either in towns or in the rural areas. Only in course of the 19th century the central government 
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of the empire succeeded in creating a more far-reaching set of administrative institutions and tightening of 
the administrative control and supervision. As Latvian historian Edgars Dunsdorfs stated succinctly: «In the 
eighteenth century in Latvia the monopoly of the state power belonged to the estate» (Dunsdorfs 1973: 379).       
Elias wrote that for the king the role of the military leader was the means to assert his authority and keep 
his kingdom together. The urge to conquer or need to defend the territory is a prominent factor which inte-
grates and binds together population of territories lying far apart. Not for all time, however, the military 
activity is possible or necessary. Under the conditions of medieval life, when wars ceased, the centrifugal 
forces set in motion again. When the king does not manifest himself in the belligerent role, his other func-
tions, for example, of the highest judge, lose significance and slip away from him. When people of scattered 
territories are not interconnected and interdependent and live mostly autonomous, autarkic life, the central 
ruler lacks the basis for power in the time of peace. There is no much need for the centrally coordinated 
infrastructure, for, under conditions of predominantly domestic and barter economy there is no need for 
developed means of communication or exchange.      
Growth of population for Elias is one of the principal moving forces behind the increase of the division of 
labour. Growth of population produces a pressure for the progressing division of labour. With the increase 
in differentiation of functions the need for more intense interaction and communication arises. There inten-
sifies the need for exchange and the means of exchange – the money (Elias 1939: 206). The spreading use of 
money in turn opens up more possibilities for differentiation in work and consumption thus setting in mo-
tion a mutually reinforcing process (ibidem).   
With the increase in interdependence among groups and regions there also arises the need for a more de-
veloped and differentiated central coordination. And with increase in the need for the centralized coordinat-
ing organ, the groups and individuals forming the demarcated figuration of mutual interdependence become 
more dependent on the central ruler. Then the power of the central ruler increases. Under these circum-
stances the ruler acquires power to impose on a larger territory a binding set of laws and make provisions 
for their enforcement. Now Elias pointed out that the structure of human interdependence has a bearing on 
the structure of the central organs of government: «The structure of the central organs corresponds to the 
structure of the division and interweaving of functions» (Elias 1939: 207). This statement helps understand 
the shape that bureaucratization of state administrations took, specifically, their departmentalization, that is, 
specialization of their functions, in the context of the civilizing process. 
It is important to note that these entwined processes of differentiation, integration, centralization, 
growth of the power of the central organs of government are, for Elias, the civilizing processes which had 
not been planned or deliberately carried out according to a consciously created design. The course of the 
civilizing processes, as he stressed in his book The Civilizing Process many times, are largely unplanned and 
unintended. Changes in the structure of human relationships and institutions, as Elias put it, were not 
planned by individuals (Elias 1939: 201). The processes of growing autonomization of the state power and 
differentiation of its organs of government, as well as changes in the habitus and ethos of personnel which 
staffed these institutions of government, too, can be understood in terms of unintended consequences of the 
civilizing process.  
Elias wrote that the level of social development which is reached by the moment of inception and consol-
idation of the political regime has a determining influence on the shape it takes (Elias 1969: 156). At the 
moment of consolidation of the states of Sweden, Denmark and Prussia there were already available im-
portant resources which could be used for building of effective infrastructures of administration: more lit-
erate population, groups of people educated in law and arts, a more monetized economy, technically better 
developed means of communication. These resources were not available for earlier state-builders, like 
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France and England (Ertman 1999). Political consolidation in the polities in question took place at the mo-
ment or intense warfare: during the Thirty Years‟ War in cases of Sweden and Prussia and during the First 
Northern war in case of Denmark. This factor facilitated centralization of the regimes.  
The administrative reforms in Sweden, which culminated in the Form of Government in 1634, took 
place during continuous wars which Sweden waged, and the king Gustavus Adolphus was personally in-
volved in campaigns in Poland and Germany and frequently was absent from Sweden. Under these condi-
tions, there was a pressure for formalization and rationalization of government. The main purpose of the 
reform was to create an efficient and continuous administration in such a way that it could continue to func-
tion even when the king was away (L. Jespersen 2000: 69; Roberts 1992: 76). An expert in history of Swe-
den Michael Roberts considered that the reforms in Sweden, implemented by the chancellor Axel Oxen-
stierna, were based on principles of «delegation of royal authority, regularization of procedures, and central-
ization of administration»  (Roberts 1992:77). He concluded that the administration in Sweden after the 
implementation of the Form of Government was «most efficient and up-to-date administrations in Europe. 
It was not corrupt, indeed, and it did not suffer from the current plague of venality…»  (Roberts 1992: 78).  
 
Along with the principle of centralization, the reformed government embodied the principle of differentia-
tion of the areas of rule. The government comprised specialized colleges which had defined areas of jurisdic-
tion and competence. On the central level there were organized five colleges: The Treasury, The Chancel-
lery, The High Court, The War College and the Admiralty. In 1637 and 1651 the Mining College and the 
College for Commerce followed. Differentiation of the areas of rule presupposed specialized qualifications – 
knowledge and skills, for the personnel performing the tasks in these colleges (Roberts 1992: 69). On the 
progressive bureaucratization Michael Roberts expressed the view that it was principally led by the need «to 
meet the increasing range and complexity of the state‟s business» and not, as some scholars had suggested, 
by the need to control population (Roberts 1984: 59). Although mostly at that time preoccupied with the 
foreign policy, the government dealt with various domestic issues: local government, crime and disturb-
ances, means of communication, religion, poor relief, education, mining and production of steel etc. To 
meet the growing complexity and number of administrative tasks, the government was significantly expand-
ed during the 17th century in terms of employed staff. To ensure due performance of tasks, to prevent abus-
es and correct maladministration, the official procedures were formalized and regularized by means of or-
dering the offices in hierarchies and internal instructions; annual inspections of the work of the colleges were 
introduced (Roberts 1992: 78). The work in the department was to become a permanent full-time job for 
the office-holders; absenteeism was punished. The office holders, as a compensation for the faithful service, 
received fixed salaries and security of tenure (Roberts 1992: 74).  
The overarching purpose of the administrative reforms in Prussia introduced by Frederick William I, ac-
cording to German historian R. Dorwart, was to ensure «centralization of authority in royal, central offices 
and officers at the expense of the territories and their institutions and the final integration of these central 
offices so as to establish a monolith of personal power and the best possible administration» (Dorwart 1953: 
123). The reforms were probably to a considerable extent designed after the Swedish pattern (Ertman 1999: 
249). These included rooting out of patrimonialism in office-holding and particularism of estates, introduc-
tion of hierarchically organized salaried offices, regular auditing and fight with corruption, strengthening the 
tax-extracting functions with the help of war commissariat, creation of uniform regulation and procedures 
for the whole administration, assuring, that the primary loyalty of the civil servants and provincial officials 
would be to the king of Prussia, not the provinces. Again, specialization according to the subject areas, ra-
ther than the territorial constituency, was found to be most suitable for meeting the needs of the centralized 
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rule. Moreover, it was discovered that specialized departments turned out to be dependent on each other 
for an effective fulfillment of the tasks; this dependency compelled them to cooperate with each other, 
which in turn reinforced centralization of government. The point of unity of the specialized colleges was the 
council of state.    
The question of loyalty of the civil servants to the king is important in the context of the present discus-
sion since strong loyalty to the king enabled the public administration to work autonomously from the ex-
ternal influences. According to Dorwart, Frederick William himself represented a new type of the states-
man in the German lands who tried to subordinate the collective particularisms of the estates and nobility to 
the common interests of the state. But he also understood that effective operation of administration depends 
on the honesty of his officials. He made provisions that officials, who connived with the violators of law, 
would be punished and dismissed from the service. If it was noticed that a civil servant does not work with 
efficient honesty, industry and thoroughness, the king tried to remedy this in cooperation with the particular 
college (Dorwart 1971: 158). Prussian bureaucracy at the time of Frederick William I is characterized by 




The case of absolutist Denmark 
Since the dissolution of the Kalmar Union there had been rivalry between Denmark and Sweden over the 
dominance in Scandinavia and over the Baltic region. Such rivalry provoked military conflicts (Jespersen 
1994: 141). In the course of the 17th century there had been a series of wars between Denmark and Sweden 
but one with substantial implications for Denmark was the war of 1657-1660. In June 1657 Denmark 
launched attack on the Swedish acquisitions in Germany, but retreated on the invasion of the Swedish army, 
which was transferred from Poland. In course of the war the very independence of Denmark was threatened 
as the Swedish troops were besieging Copenhagen in 1659. It was saved with the help of the Dutch navy and 
interference of England and France. According to the terms of the treaty of Copenhagen the Danish prov-
inces in the south of the Scandinavian peninsula (Halland, Skåne and Blekinge) and some other territories 
were ceded to Sweden. The war had significant domestic consequences for Denmark. As a result of the war 
the state acquired a huge debt. The king convened a general assembly of the estates in order to discuss the 
problem of saving the finances of the state. The question was raised about the burden of taxation of the no-
bility. The commoners voiced the complaints about the exemption of the nobility from the duty of taxation 
(Jespersen 2004: 40). In addition, the nobility was held responsible by the commoners for launching the 
disastrous attack on Sweden and military defeats (Bonney 1991: 255). In this situation the king used the 
support of burghers and clergy and the kingship became hereditary. This meant that the accession to the 
throne would become automatic and there would be no need for the accession charter. The constitutional 
change altered the power balance in the country. The nobility lost its political privileges and the council was 
abolished. Hannibal Sehested, who was a stadtholder  (governor) in Norway, was appointed a treasurer and 
introduced the administrative reforms on the Swedish model (ibidem.). The nobility lost its monopoly on the 
offices of the state and it was proclaimed that hereafter these would be open on the basis of merit, also to the 
commoners. In a way quite unique for that historical period in Europe, there was issued a Royal Law (con-
stitution) in 1665, which proclaimed “absolute sovereign power the king” and established a direct relation-
ship between the king and the subjects. The Article IV of the Law stated: 
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The king alone shall have the supreme power and authority to appoint and dismiss all officials, high and low, no 
matter what name or title they may have, according to his own free will and judgment, so that all offices and posi-
tions, no matter what authority they possess, shall have their first source, as from a spring, in the absolute power 
of the king (translated in: Ekman 1957: 106).  
 
In the early 1600s central administration in Denmark did not have a permanent character with depart-
ments organized on the functional basis with clearly defined areas of responsibility. The accession charter 
constrained the king in choosing the officials and organizing the work of administration. Some of the officials 
had multiple loyalties to the king, the council and the estates (Jespersen 2000: 72). This pertains also to the 
chief offices of the state (Steward (finances), Marshal (army), Admiral (navy), Chancellor (judiciary)), which 
largely had medieval feudal character.  
After reorganization the government consisted of six colleges: Chancellery College, Treasury College, 
Commercial College, Admiralty College, War College and German Chancellery (which in general was deal-
ing with foreign affairs. The heads of the colleges were subordinated to the king and his Privy Council (Jes-
persen 2000: 77). Local administration was reorganized as well. Amtsmænd (regional governors) placed un-
der subordination and supervision of Chancellery College, Treasury College and Commercial College were 
substituted for lensmænd, the local governors usually selected from the local nobility. Some military and tax-
collecting functions of lensmænd were removed and placed under separate state offices (Jespersen 2000: 78).   
Leon Jespersen stresses a number of consequences of the introduction of college principle of organization 
of government for the position of officials. The division of the field of responsibility meant increased de-
mand for qualification and had consequences for the selection of candidates for offices (Jespersen 2000: 69). 
The work in the government was now a full-time job. Previously it was considered a sort of a public duty, 
which did not presuppose specialized knowledge or performance on the full-time basis. This had a conse-
quence that it could be fulfilled irregularly, arbitrarily, and at pleasure. Now the civil servant was paid a sal-
ary in money. 
Another principle of the new administration was that the colleges were to function continuously, no mat-
ter whether the individual members of the colleges were at places or not. Unpermitted absence was prohib-
ited. The place of the meetings of the college could not be changed. «This reflected the principle of authori-
ty, which had to work in definite forms» (Jespersen 2000: 69).  
An official henceforth could exercise the authority only in the area of the responsibility of his college. 
«This formally indicated a new kind of distinction between a man and his office» (ibidem). Before the reforms 
exercising of the public duties was associated with the privileges of personal character attached to particular 
individuals.  
Leon Jespersen considers that the development of the college system of government was a consequence 
of changed socio-economic circumstances (increased complexity of the tasks of the central administration) 
and situation in the sphere of security and foreign policy, as Denmark had to find means to defend itself 
against the threat from Sweden (Jespersen 2000: 78-79). Harald Gustavsson points to the connection be-
tween bureaucratization and integration meaning by that subordination of the territory of the state to a sin-
gle system of rule (Gustavsson 1994: 77). This integration, however, should be seen also as a systemic inte-
gration of the realm by virtue of which the country came to be perceived as internally connected whole, 
what was described above, with the reference to Elias, as a growing interdependence of the regions of the 
realm, economic differentiation of functions, division of labour and formation of the country as an economic 
entity. There was a corresponding intellectual development in political and administrative thinking. Organi-
zation of government on the departmental basis was a realization of a new perception of the state seen from 
a more detached and abstracted point.   
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Such new perception and the social and technical development which backed it, made it possible and in 
effect necessary to organize the governance of the territory on the departmental principle. The formerly 
quasi-independent estates of the nobility lost their autonomy and became territories or provinces of state. 
Each department (or college or ministry) had a competence and authority for a certain aspect of the whole, 
which was “assembled” for the purpose of governance in the Privy Council or king‟s chancellery. Authority 
of departments cut across borders of the estates. The departmentalization also introduced the principle of 
specialization and knowledge-based competence in the professional code of the civil servants.  
British historian Richard Bonney wrote that the rise of the European absolutism was a tendency in the 
17th century (Bonney 1991: 358). But such abrupt and radical shift as it happened in Denmark in 1660 was 
very rare. In most countries assemblies retained some power. The king ensured that the estates renounced 
the criticism and opposition to his power. On the other hand there was drawn a constitutional law which 
stipulated certain obligations on the king, and in this respect the case of Denmark was quite unique (Bonney 
1991: 359). In practice the absolute regime was not despotic. The Danish Law issued in 1683 set boundaries 
to the interference of the power of the state and presupposed civil freedoms, for example, to enter legally 
bounding agreements for the subjects (Jespersen 2004: 47). Absolutism in Denmark was considered com-
patible with civil freedoms, a line of thinking similar to Samuel Pufendorf, whose book De Officiis in Danish 
appeared in 1742 (Horstbøll 1988:16, Horstbøll and Østergård 1990: 158).   
Perhaps it could be considered a peculiar Danish development that public administration due to historical 
and constitutional reasons assumed a role of the channel of communication and interaction between the cen-
tral government and the subjects. This served also as a formative and disciplining condition for the civil serv-
ants. Civil servants were expected to be loyal to the king and professional in performing their tasks. At the 
same time they had a duty to deal with subjects and their issues who had the right to send a petition to the 
higher level. The subjects also had the right to make an appeal to the court or present a complaint about the 
official. Even before the abolition of absolutism in 1848 the citizens had the right to request the grounds for 
the administrative decisions from the officials.   
In Denmark in the 18th century the hierarchy of officials encompassed the whole country, with some lim-
itations on the local level. The official procedures, routines and the filing system were relatively well de-
fined, especially on the central level. There was introduced in 1736 an obligatory examination in law for 
candidates for positions in the civil service which was to be passed at the University of Copenhagen.  
H. Gustaffson characterizes the system of state administration in Denmark as «to a considerable extent a 
professional bureaucracy which was in some ways set apart from the rest of population»  (Gustafsson 1994: 
92). Denmark, along with other Nordic countries, inherited in the 19th century well consolidated and disci-




Habitus of the civil servant 
N. Elias underlined that in order to understand and explain the civilizing processes one has to investigate 
both social structure and habitus and their transformations (Elias 1939: 411). One of the sources of infor-
mation about the norms of conduct in the past is the manuals of good behavior. For the case of royal admin-
istration of Denmark, one can have a source of similar kind in the form of a book written by a civil servant in 
the 19th century. Study of this source can give an idea of the patterns of self-restraint and self-image of the 
civil servant in the Danish royal administration of that time. 
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A senior civil servant of the Royal Customs and Commerce College Frederik Stoud (1759-1823) under 
pseudonym Frederik Corsten in 1816 published a book On writing official letters (Olsen 2002: 618). This 
book, consisting of two volumes, was written in a form of six “letters” in which a senior and experienced 
civil servant addressed a newly employed civil servant. The book addressed the issue of official correspond-
ence in different situations: responding to a complaint, giving grounds to a citizen about a decision taken in 
his case, writing a letter to a minister or a colleague etc. The principal aim of the book was to give advice to 
young civil servants on how to write official letters in terms of language, to ensure that it is understandable 
to non-specialist citizen, and in terms of giving grounds for the official decisions. Intended to be a manual of 
the official language to be used in the public administration, Frederik Stoud, however, could not avoid deal-
ing with wider issues of ethics of civil servants, particularly, the attitudes towards the wider social environ-
ment and the ethical principles which should govern the conduct of the civil servant.   
Professionalism, objectivity and fairness were the key concepts of good administrative practice for Stoud. 
In Stoud‟s book the experienced civil servant instructed the young one that it was obligatory in every case to 
examine the situation truthfully. Pursuing the truth was crucial for the administrative practice in Stoud‟s 
view.  
A Danish expert in public law Jens Olsen in a book chapter on good administrative practices wrote that 
during the period of the absolutist regime a civil servant presenting his case and decision to the king had to 
demonstrate to the king that he had made a comprehensive and thorough work. To be meticulous and thor-
ough in investigating a case, to take it with seriousness, are the attitudes also underlined by Stoud. Presenta-
tion of the cases had to be based strictly on legal principles and this tradition has remained in place until 
nowadays.    
Jens Olsen mentions a case from the administrative practice from 1848. A group of army officers was 
applying for a permission to hunt in a particular area. A civil servant rejected this application, referring to 
several arguments. There was no reason to give such hunting rights because everybody else could not obtain 
it; and if only one group would be given permission, other groups in the society would be annoyed by that 
(Olsen 2002: 619).   
A basic principle of conduct was a complete loyalty of the civil servant to the king. Loyalty to the society, 
however, was also considered important by Stoud, although not as much as loyalty to the king. The deci-
sions taken by the civil servants had to serve primarily the good of the state but also the good of the bour-
geois society (common citizens). 
Stoud treated the issue of the honour of the civil servant. He wrote that in particular situations decisions 
taken by the civil servant may not be liked by the general public, despite that they are very well grounded. If 
these decisions are for the good of the state and the government, the high ranking civil servant has to bear 
the non-sympathetic attitude towards him, thereby sacrificing himself, but saving the honour of the state. He 
should not try to provide unofficial justification to save his image; his personal image may suffer, but this 
situation should be accepted by the civil servant for the sake of serving the state and the government.     
Loyalty was also understood in a quite broad and abstract way, as loyalty to profound, sacrosanct princi-
ples of natural law. The civil servant has to be loyal to them. But he has to be critical to his understanding of 
these higher principles. Especially in the situations, when the opinion of the civil servant is opposed by socie-
ty or colleagues, he should thoroughly and critically evaluate his understanding of the principles of natural 
law and reflect upon his application of particular higher principles of natural law to the case in question.   
Honesty and dignity are other core values for Stoud. He takes it as absolutely mandatory and obvious that 
a civil servant should never accept bribes. Honesty and dignity mean in this context complete resistance to 
corruption. This was particularly important for Stoud because he worked in Customs and Commerce Col-
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lege which was dealing with extraction of taxes and dues and where corruption risks were high. He was also 
mentioning that to receive excessive per diems for the civil servants traveling around country to fulfill their 
duties was unacceptable and should be avoided because general citizens would disapprove that. Only if the 
civil servant is clearly by law entitled to per diems, he can accept them. Civil servant cannot ask for extra 
income from the state for travelling on the basis of past practice. This would be inappropriate and a violation 
of the principle that a civil servant cannot be a judge in his own case. A civil servant should be objective and 
forget himself in making decisions (Olsen 2002: 620). 
A good civil servant, according to Stoud, should be able to give orders. The civil servant has to be able to 
effectively pursue implementation of his decisions on the basis of his conviction about the truth in these deci-
sions even despite eventual opposition. Despite that a civil servant may be exposed to criticism, if he is able 
to defend his decisions, he will be highly valued by the government. Loyalty and honesty should back his 
conduct in the face of possible opposition (ibidem).  
A civil servant should take necessary time to evaluate cases and make the right decisions. Doing things in 
a hurry can damage handling and scrutiny of the cases. It also goes against the esprit de corps of the depart-
ment, because it is a good practice that a civil servant, if necessary, asks advice of his colleagues. A civil serv-
ant dealing with an application or a case should make sure that his decision is in a common spirit of his col-
leagues. This would increase the fairness and higher quality of decision. At the same time, in some cases the 





Seen from the perspective of the theory of the civilizing process, bureaucratization can be understood as 
a part of a conscious state-building activity embedded within  unplanned and unintended civilizing processes. 
Entwined processes of differentiation, integration and centralization of polities created conditions for auton-
omization of the state and its apparatus and growth and departmentalization of the institutions of govern-
ment. The latter processes enabled the state bureaucracy to become detached from society and maintain au-
tonomy of its operations and valuations. Bureaucratization formed a new habitus of individuals. Many of 
those employed in state bureaucracy came to exemplify such qualities as industriousness, thoroughness and 
accuracy, honesty, loyalty, efficiency, competence, politeness, self-control and detachment from personal 
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